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The Censorship “Propaganda” Legislation in Russia 
By Alexander Kondakov.57 
In June 2013, Russian Parliament (the State Duma) 
adopted the bill 135-FZ meant to “protect children 
from information that promotes denial of 
traditional family values.”58 This piece of legislation 
amended several federal laws and the Code of 
Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation 
with the final purpose to ban from public access 
something called “propaganda of non-traditional 
sexual relations”.  
Most importantly, the bill ads Article 6.21 to the 
Administrative Code that establishes responsibility 
for dissemination of information about “non-
traditional sexual relations” punishable by fines (for 
citizens and officials), fines and suspension of 
organizational activities (for entities) or fines and 
deportation (for foreign nationals and stateless 
persons).59  
This law does not deliver on criminal liability; it is a 
misdemeanour that has a specific legal procedure 
and different legal consequences in comparison to 
criminal law. Substantially, the “propaganda” law is 
a censorship legislation that limits people’s 
freedom of expression. It simply prohibits certain 
information from being part of the commonly 
accessible domain. 
First attempts to ban “homosexual” 
propaganda 
Initially, the bill was introduced to the Duma in 
2012 by regional parliamentarians from the 
Novosibirsk branch of the United Russia Party. 
Their proposition was more articulate as they 
sought to ban “propaganda of homosexuality” just 
like in a dozen other regions across Russia where 
similar legislation was already in place.60 The first in 
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line was the Ryazan region, where the propaganda 
bill was introduced as early as 2006. In that period 
at the federal level, Member of Parliament 
Aleksandr Chuev had been trying to criminalise 
“propaganda of homosexual lifestyle” for some 
years after unsuccessful attempts to criminalise 
“sodomy” beforehand. Wording of his legislation 
drafts (also proved unsuccessful due to the criminal 
nature of his legal initiative) were mostly inspired 
by decisions of the Constitutional Court of the 
Russian Federation regarding national family 
values, as well as by the US evangelicals’ doctrine of 
“traditional family values”.61  
This language was used in drafting the current law 
with the purpose of avoiding overtly mentioning 
"homosexuality" so that the text itself would not 
“promote” what it sought to prohibit. Thus, by 
summer 2013 despite protests from the Duma’s 
Law Department, the Duma’s Committee on 
Family, Women and Children headed by the 
Member of Parliament Yelena Mizulina drafted the 
ban of “non-traditional sexual relations” supported 
by all but one parliamentarian during voting. 
Prohibited conduct 
Despite common misconception, this piece of 
legislation is very straightforward and clear. The 
text of the law says that if someone promotes “non-
traditional sexual relations” to minors, then they 
have to face legal consequences. The ways in which 
one may “promote” these relations are of two 
types:  
a) personal presentation (private conversation,
teaching, public rally and campaigning) or 
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b) mediated presentation (airing on the Internet
or TV, in newspapers and magazines). 
Moreover, an actual child must not be in fact 
exposed to the information in question: children in 
general should be able to access the information in 
order for it to be considered “propaganda”. This 
also uncovers the nature of “propaganda” in the 
text of the law: since a child is not required to be 
present at the event of alleged misdemeanour, then 
any consequences of the information to the child’s 
sexual orientation are of no legal relevance. In 
other words, although the law pretends to protect 
children from the “harm” of becoming gay, it does 
not matter if any particular child has been really 
converted to a gay person as a result of being 
exposed to a plaintiff’s political rally banner.  
In the absurdist world of Russian legislators, this is 
a smart move because otherwise no case would 
stand trial. The legislators do mention that in result 
of children’s exposure to information about “non-
traditional sexual relations” the following 
possibilities are projected: “formation of non-
traditional sexual attitudes,” “attraction to non-
traditional sexual relations,” “perverse impression 
of social equality between traditional and non-
traditional sexual relations,” etc.  
However, the practice of the law demonstrates that 
no proof of these effects on children is ever 
required in the courtroom. This law is about quality 
of information (its potential ability to convince 
someone that queer sexuality is a normal part of 
our society and even maybe an interesting practice 
to try), not about human capacity to experiment 
with one’s sexuality under external influence.  
The law targets information: as a censorship law, it 
limits freedom of expression. Court experts are 
called upon to testify that a piece of information 
may potentially ignite children’s interest in 
homosexuality and therefore, it is a piece of 
“propaganda.” Hence, the “frightening” 
consequences of “gay propaganda” are nothing 
more than rhetorical ornaments that serve for the 
creation of moral panic. 
The notion of “non-traditional sexual relations” 
Furthermore, in the federal legislation, the formula 
“non-traditional sexual relations” does divert 
attention from a franker wording, such as St. 
Petersburg’s “propaganda of homosexuality, 
lesbianism, bisexuality and transgenderism” 
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(paraphrased “LGBT” acronym). Yet, the Supreme 
Court of the Russian Federation previously clarified 
that “traditional sexual relations” do not include 
lesbian experiences, male homosexuality, 
bisexuality and transgender issues, so these are 
considered “non-traditional”.  
Besides, people rarely learn about law from legal 
books. Thus, while lawyers have the Supreme 
Court’s rulings to understand a correct 
interpretation of “non-traditional” sexuality, other 
people may rely on TV and newspaper articles, 
where this linguistic formula is heavily used in 
reference to LGBTQ questions. Therefore, no 
mistake shall be committed in interpretation of the 
law by legal professionals or lay people.  
The effects and consequences of the law 
This last point actually bares discussion of the 
effects of the law. First, as any censorship law and 
contrary to its said purpose, the bill 135-FZ 
generated a lot of interest to the object it censored. 
Studies show that there are more publications 
about queer sexualities in Russia after adoption of 
the law than before it.62 Certainly, some of them are 
meant to convince the public that it is in danger of 
"homosexuality". This is especially so for materials 
aired on government-controlled media resources. 
Yet, other publications, on the contrary, try to 
convey a more LGBTQ-friendly approach and are 
published in “oppositional” or independent media. 
Some of these latter types of materials were 
subjected to administrative litigation, while others 
are freely available anyway. The thing is that in 
order to open an administrative case, state 
agencies have to show that a publication in 
question was meant for children. Hence, if a sign 
marked the said publication as intended for an “18+ 
age” audience, then a case cannot be built.  
Secondly, the law also generated legal 
enforcement; it is not an inactive piece of 
legislation (see “The implementation of the law” 
below).  
Finally, the law also has social effects beyond its 
legal implementation or censorship controversies. 
Most importantly, academic and activist studies 
registered growth of violence against LGBTQ 
populations in Russia after 2013.63  
The “propaganda” law is a symbolic articulation of 
the government’s hatred policy. The law officially 
established that some citizens of Russia are of less 
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value than others (its text refers to “social equality” 
between sexual groups as a “perverse impression” 
one must be protected from). Thus, the law and 
official political commentaries around it spread and 
reinforced the idea that queer sexualities are 
wrong. Judging from the growth of violence against 
LGBTQ people in Russia, some bigots acted 
violently upon this conclusion. 
Russia’s legislation in limiting LGBTQ populations’ 
freedom of expression also has an international 
dimension. As the result of this official policy of 
bigotry, many queer people in Russia felt especially 
threatened and endangered, even experiencing 
actual violence and persecution because of their 
sexual or gender identities. Therefore, some of 
them had to flee the country and seek for 
international protection in safer places.  
On the other hand, the law generated positive 
responses in some Post-Socialist countries. Similar 
“anti-propaganda” laws have been considered in 
Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Hungary, Moldova, 
Belarus, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and 
Armenia. All attempts have proved unsuccessful so 
far, but the issue brings these states closer together 
despite political rivalry and mutual grievances and 
therefore, may have further developments. 
Conclusion 
In sum, the 135-FZ law banning “propaganda of 
non-traditional sexual relations” to minors is a 
censorship legislation that limits freedom of 
expression by making neutral and positive 
information about LGBTQ topics a misdemeanor 
subjected to penalties. The text of the law is clear, 
and the procedure of its implementation does not 
require an actual child to be harmed in any way. 
This is why it is relatively easily enforced, especially 
in cases against media outlets and activists’ 
publications.  
The legislation has a variety of other effects, 
beyond its implementation. One of the most 
important results of the spread of bigotry it 
generated is the growth of violence against queer 
populations in Russia. Since the law is in place, 
Russia is a less safe location for queer expressions 
than it has been before. Therefore, the law sends 
the country backwards on the line of progression to 
a more inclusive sexual citizenship. 
 
 
The implementation of the law 
Currently, for the years 2013-2018 there are at least 57 
court rulings in the official state registrar of court decisions 
managed by the Ministry of Justice (unfortunately, not all 
court rulings appear in this database and not all of them are 
properly classified).  
The graph shows the number of cases in which the law is 
cited in these rulings: the majority of court decisions are 
taken in respect to media publications.  
These cases are most commonly brought to court by Russia’s 
censorship agency, Roskomnadzor (The Federal Service for 
Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and 
Mass Media). Cases regarding political rallies are initiated by 
LGBTQ activists who are denied the right to conduct a public 
rally by municipal authorities on the ground of the 
“propaganda” law and then challenge this decision in courts.  
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